



macOS Sierra

Enterprise Security



**Disclaimer:**

**I am not responsible if a Macintosh is broken due to following these steps**



## What will be discussed:

- Firmware Password
- Installer Images & First Boot
- Admin & Standard Accounts
- Hibernation ~vs~ Sleep
- Firewall
- Services & Daemons
- Spotlight Suggestions
- Homebrew
- DNS
- Captive Portal
- Certificate Authorities
- OpenSSL, Curl & Privoxy
- Browsers
- PGP & GPG
- OTR, Tor & VPN
- Viruses & Malware
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- Password Management
- Backups
- Wi-Fi
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- Physical Access
- System Monitoring
- Binary Whitelisting
- Profile Manager
- Audit & Forensics
- Additional Resources


## Firmware Password

- Prevents your Mac from starting up from alternate storage
- Can be reset in Apple store with proof of ownership
- Alternatively managed with 'firmwarepasswd' utility
- May be set to be required at every boot



# Firmware Password

Using a Dediprog SF600 to dump and flash SPI chip





## Installer Images & First Boot

- Installing from Recover Mode reveals the system's serial number over the network in plain text when communicating with Apple
- Server app includes the System Image utility and NetBoot service
- Custom restorable images can contain pre/post-install scripts
- Additional software can be automatically installed at 1st boot
- Macs can be installed/restored using target disk mode & USB
- Recovery partitions are optional and customizable



## Installer Images & First Boot

- Post-install scripts can also be managed with Chilcote Outset [ <https://github.com/chilcote/outset/> ] (written in python)
- Use Outset to process packages, profiles, and/or scripts at every boot/logon/logoff/on-demand
- AutoDMG is an alternative install image tool [ <https://github.com/MagerValp/AutoDMG/> ]
- The computer/host names can be set using 'scutil'  
eg: `$ sudo scutil --set ComputerName your_computer_name`

## Admin & Standard Accounts

- Every system must have at least one Admin account
- Hide the admin account's home folder and login window ID, and disable admin's ability to disable file vault
- Standard users have no access to some preference panes, console, sudo, or modifying system folder or applications




## Hybernation ~vs~ Sleep

- Sleep leaves the contents of memory in place
- Sleep uses EFI memory to store the FileVault master key
- Hybernate removes contents from RAM and EFI memory
- The 'pmset' utility is used to manage sleep/hybernate/keys

# Firewall

- Application firewall (socketfilter) blocks incoming connections
- Stealth mode prevents responses to ICMP and on closed ports
- Built-in and Code-Signed software whitelists by default
- Little Snitch, Hands Off, Radio Silence and Security Growler: provides ability to monitor & block outbound traffic at a granular level
- pf as the kernel level system firewall [ Murus ]
- pf has the ability to audit phone-home behavior [ <https://github.com/fix-macosx/net-monitor> ]





## Services & Daemons

- Disable services which home, perform other useless functions  
[ <https://github.com/karek314/macOS-home-call-drop> ]
- Review daemons, agents and services for the system and users  
[ <http://launchd.info> ] “LaunchControl”  
[ <https://github.com/synack/knockknock> ]
- Manage security services (wireshark, audit/security scripts, etc)

## Spotlight Suggestions

- Spotlight is by default chatty with Microsoft, Google, etc...
- Disable spotlight suggestions in System Preferences and Safari
- Change the default search engine to DuckDuckGo
- Modify spotlight settings to exclude servers
- Disable spotlight from searching undesired locations, files
- Disabel spotlight from indexing text
- See also: [fix-macosx.com](http://fix-macosx.com) & [fix10.isleaked.com](http://fix10.isleaked.com)



# Homebrew

- Makes software installations easier to manage
- The missing repository
- Replaces Fink Commander, others from earlier OSX
- Make cron script to periodically update/upgrade
- Remember to opt-out of homebrew analytics
- Be mindful of installing at a system/user level
- Enable additional homebrew security options



# DNS

- Use the hosts file to block known undesirable domains  
[ <https://github.com/StevenBlack/hosts/> ]
- Use internal FQDN servers and monitor queries separately
- dnsmasq can cache replies to reduce traffic, prevent problems
- Ensure the system is in a DNSSEC protected zone
- Defined search domains can be useful on departmental basis
- Best to manually set DNS servers, do not use DHCP
- dnscrypt can wrap your dns client/server traffic in a condom



## Captive Portal

- When macOS connects to a SHITTY network, the probe it sends out will signal positive for a (malware ridden) captive portal (F U!!!)
- This happens often at established organizations (rouge IT)
- Vulnerable to hijacking attack, known as wispr request
- **DISABLE THIS CRAP IMMEDIATELY**
- ‘sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.captive.control Active -bool false’

## Certificate Authorities

- macOS has >200 root authority certificates installed
- Risk of a man in the middle attack in which a coerced or compromised CA trusted by the system issues a fake/rouge SSL
- This is a growing problem today
- Use an internal CA which handles requests for all third parties
- Manage the internal CA separately, disable trust in ALL on macOS



## OpenSSL, CURL & Privoxy

- The version of OpenSSL in Sierra is 0.9.8zh, which is not current
- Apple declares OpenSSL deprecated, distributes custom patches
- Use homebrew to install the latest OpenSSL 'brew install openssl'
- curl uses Secure Transport for SSL/TLS validation
- Most prefer OpenSSL, replace curl 'brew install curl --with-openssl'
- privoxy provides convenient local web traffic filtering
- Set system-wide proxy settings to point to it, make custom rules

## Browsers

- Firefox and Chrome are preferred (not at default configuration)
- Disable flash in Chrome. Never install Java, Flash or Silverlight!!!!
- Use PrivacyFox, NoScript, Ghostery and tie into management
- Use separate profiles for browsing Trusted, iffy, and risky sites
- Disable WebRTC with uBlock Origin
- Safari looks nice, but is a disaster at the code level.
- Safari can be blocked from use in user profiles on macOS Server



## PGP & GPG

- PGP used for encrypting email end-to-end
- GPG used to verifying signatures of software, and encrypting symmetrically and asymmetrically files and text
- Modify the GPG default configuration
- Trust the local GPG key servers (should be safe)
- Mail integration is available as a gnu applicaiton

## OTR, TOR & VPN

- The most popular chat program for macOS is Adium
- profanity is a decent console based chat application
- tor messenger is a great one for anonymity
- tor browser guarantees anonymity, difficult to do in browser+tor
- local tor relays are acceptable alternatives, may not always work
- Viscosity adds OpenVPN as menu item, works great with pfSense
- Possible to configure pf to only allow VPN traffic, block otherwise



## Viruses & Malware

- Macs are NOT immune to Malware, but hold up better than most
- Winderz sees... ~1.3 million new signatures each day, mac: .017
- 3rd party anti-virus for mac increases attack surface
- The best program is a user-supported "CommonSense2016"
- This is a powerful unix system, more powerful than 3rd parties
- NEVER bolt on security, integrate into the system's architecture

## System Integrity Protection

- SIP enabled by default beginning in macOS 10.11
  - Must be disabled for modifying some CA's or launch daemons
  - csrutil is used to check the status, modifying done in recovery
  - Applies to every running process, including privileged code and sandboxed applications
  - Prevents code injection and runtime attachments on file systems
  - Enables the "rootless" feature in unix
- [ <https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/193368/> ]



## Gatekeeper & XProtect

- Gatekeeper prevents unsigned programs and files from opening
- XProtect prevents the execution of known bad files and outdated plugin versions, but does nothing to cleanup existing malware
- macOS attaches metadata (HFS+ extended attributes) to files

# Password Management

- Strong passwords generated with OpenSSL, GPG, /dev/urandom, or keychain tools
- Keychain provides system-wide password/cert management
- Keychain is encrypted with a PBKDF2 derived key  
[ [juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-osx-keychain](http://juusosalonen.com/post/30923743427/breaking-into-the-osx-keychain) ]
- Keychain does not encrypt names of corresponding passwords
- GnuPG also provides sufficient alternative password management
- ALWAYS use two factor where available, reconsider where not
- Yubikey is a great hardware two-factor solution



# Backups

- Always encrypt sensitive data before backing it up  
[ `tar zcvf - ~/Downloads | gpg -c > ~/Desktop/pr0n.tar.gz.gpg` ]
- Always encrypt time machine backups
- Other useful programs: SpiderOak, Arq, Espionage, and restic

## Wi-Fi

- Option+Click the WiFi menu item for additional info/tools
- Apple devices tend to broadcast all remembered network names
- Maintain the list of remembered wifi via policies  
[ /Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.airport.preferences.plist ]
- Enable WPA2-Enterprise and leave the rest restricted from users
- Maintaining a regularly randomly spoofed mac address helps with privacy when allowing users to connect to foreign networks
- Disable WEP, unencrypted connections in policy management



# SSH

- For outgoing SSH connections, use hardware or password protected keys (NOT THE TRADITIONAL METHOD IN BASH)
- Modify the default ssh client configuration files to meet policies
- Works great with privoxy to encapsulate tunneled traffic
- iTerm is a terrific alternative to Terminal (in Technicolor)

## Physical Access

- usbkill can be used to shut down the system upon changes
- Volume encryption
- Policies for lock, screensaver, passwords, etc...



# System Monitoring

- OpenBSM audit built into macOS
- Monitors process execution, network activity, and much more
- DTrace built-in system-wide for convenient process audits
- Includes iosnoop, opensnoop, execsnoop, errinfo, & dtruss
- ps, lsof, netstat are included by default
- Wireshark runs great natively on macOS
- also see: [ <https://github.com/BonzaiThePenguin>Loading/> ]

## Binary Whitelisting

- Santa is a security software developed for Google's Mac Fleet [ <https://github.com/google/santa/> ]
- Santa uses Kernel Authorization API to monitor and allow/disallow binaries from executing in the kernel.
- Binaries can be white/black listed by unique hash or dev cert
- bash, python and other interpreters are whitelisted (since they are signed by Apple's dev cert), so Santa will be unable to block such scripts from executing. Such scripts can disable Santa.



## Profile Manager

- Can perform Macintosh and Mobile Device Management
- Can enforce boot, login, logout, and other custom scripts
- Configures various parts of the system effortlessly across domain
- Can be used to install/maintain/block third party software
- Full remote management down to the updates, proxies, etc...

## Audit & Forensics

- OSquery: used to retrieve low level system information  
[ <https://github.com/facebook/osquery/> ]
- grr: incident response framework focused on remote forensics  
[ <https://github.com/google/grr/> ]
- osxcollector: forensic evidence collection & analysis toolkit  
[ <https://github.com/yelp/osxcollector/> ]
- OSXAuditor: analyzes artifacts on a running system, such as quarantined files, Safari, Chrom and Firefox history, downloads, HTML5 databases and localstore, social media and email accounts, WiFi...  
[ <https://github.com/jipegit/OSXAuditor/> ]



# Additional Resources

This will be included with the final published slides

found on:

[dc214.org](http://dc214.org)